From: Sengen Sun (sengensun$##$yahoo.com)
Date: Sat Sep 02 2006 - 17:09:30 EDT
Professor Boyles clearly recognized a mis-use of the
word "cause,".... "they can be exceptionally confusing
to students on the linguistic level alone."
But he explained in several different ways in
PHILCHEM_L why such a "mis-use" is justified in text
books and in literature.
>> "good scientists are aware of these things"...
>>"Empirical scientists work with many
>>presuppositions and take many things
>>for granted to simply 'get the job done,'".
Then, why are we a group of people who claim to be
emerging philosophers of chemistry? What emerging for?
Just follow experimentalists, "get the job done", make
money, pound on the decades-long confusions, and make
them more and more solid? Are we willing to think "how
philosophy is practised" uniquely?
Further, it is a screaming sound to me that Shahbazian
and Zahedi called for a "global convention"(!!!!!) in
their conclusion of a 15 text page article in
Foundations of Chemistry, although I absolutely have
no idea what they want specifically. I guess, during a
possible "global convention," some one is going to say
something like:
"we got to enjoy the beauty of mistakes (or mis-uses)
created by our older generations. Please do not say
that "the sp3 hybridization of the carbon atom in
methane DOES NOT cause its tetrahedral geometry", as
it is not language-economic by adding two more words
"DOES NOT". A single word "cause" is much more
convenient as the meaning of "cause" has never been
vigorously defined and as there is no causal relation
here.... "
Please enjoy the "clear chemical language", a new
emerging philosophy, and finally a funny international
joke, my friends!
Sengen
> From: "Boyles, David A." <David.Boyles$##$SDSMT.EDU>
> Subject: Re: PHILCHEM Digest - 28 Aug 2006 to 31 Aug
> 2006 (#2006-30)
>
> Sengen:
>
> In the statement "The sp3 hybridization of the
> carbon atom in methane causes its tetrahedral
> geometry" as cited, we find a mis-use of the word
> "cause," and a prevalent one, at that, in textbooks,
> not to mention for example which of Aristotle's four
> causes are being invoked--if any. Not presuming to
> know with precision what Shahbazian and Zahedi
> think, it is clear nonetheless that they are saying
> that in a circular way we have two propositions--a
> statement on hybridization, and a quite separate one
> on geometry--which are referentially linked so as to
> provide explanatory power. These two statements
> have become linked, even though historically their
> origins are very separated in time. What is
> particularly interesting, perhaps, is that the most
> recent proposition--hybridization theory--is used as
> an explanatory cause of an earlier proposition, the
> geometry of carbon (albeit with the caveat carbon in
> some compounds only, and not all, although the
> textbook statement does not sa!
> y as much). Why this is the case and not the other
> way around warrants its own scrutiny, but in any
> case the impression is thus given of the
> supervenience of earlier ideas which are apparently
> obvious (geometrical objects) on later ideas which
> are not at all overtly obvious (orbital theory), as
> though the latter were the "cause" or perhaps more
> correctly (?) the explanation of (?) or reason for
> (?) the former. I believe good scientists are
> aware of these things, while others are unaware of
> them, or at least unaware of the philosophical
> issues engendered by them, including their
> ontological and epistemological implications to our
> understanding of phenomena themselves.
>
> These kinds of statements are typically found in
> 'textbooks' which conflate separate ideas.
> Evidently this has several purposes, including
> economy of verbiage on one hand, and reinforcement
> of related concepts in student minds on the other.
> Far from intellectually rigorous, such level books
> attempt with economy to present language statements
> first and foremost as tools, as code-words which
> students will hopefully realize are only that as
> their academic careers develop.
>
> Apart from the scientifically utilitarian purpose
> such statements might have on the 'textbook' level,
> they can be exceptionally confusing to students on
> the linguistic level alone. I recall very vividly
> how my undergraduate years foundered on puzzlement
> not so much on the fact that there are many ideas
> (propositions)in chemical space, but on the very
> words used to relate one to another. Words such as
> 'cause' which were never defined, but put into the
> background 'created' much consternation to my own
> learning experience.
>
> Far from trying to do the impossible and purge or
> rework the language of textbooks, however, one would
> do better to realize that textbooks are only
> textbooks, and that for all the philosophical
> problems present, that such problems are inherent in
> any explanation, in any proposition, in any language
> as philosophy is preeminently appreciated in making
> us aware. Empirical scientists work with many
> presuppositions and take many things for granted to
> simply 'get the job done,' (including atomic theory
> in my case--I weigh out compounds for my chemical
> reactions in slavish subordination to the "count"
> model of John Dalton whether or not it corresponds
> to atoms makes little difference--a pianist must
> likewise perform on something and in that case it
> can by definition be but a keyboard of a piano)
> presuppositions that require and deserve analysis in
> philosophy. One begins to realize that after formal
> education, perhaps, and not during it. Formal
> education is a slice of reality, a pl!
> atform of understanding, but not das Ding itself.
>
> Best Wishes,
>
> David A. Boyles
> Professor of Chemistry
> Department of Chemistry
> South Dakota School of Mines and Technology
> Rapid City, SD 57701
>
> From: Ivan Antonowitz <binchem$##$MWEB.CO.ZA>
> Subject: Re: Comments on A Critique of Chemical
> Language
>
> David A. Boyles posted:
> >>
> [snip]
> Not presuming to know with precision what
> Shahbazian and Zahedi think, it
> is clear nonetheless that they are saying that in a
> circular way we have two
> propositions--a statement on hybridization, and a
> quite separate one on
> geometry--which are referentially linked so as to
> provide explanatory power.
> These two statements have become linked, even though
> historically their
> origins are very separated in time.
> [snip]
> <<
>
> The keystone phrase in the above sentences is
> "referentially linked". In the
> Ordinary Language of Chemists, Philosophy and
> Psychology are so
> "referentially linked" as to be indistinguishable
> from each other [thus
> turning David's concept inside-out].
>
> Many are taken aback to find that few people Read
> what the author Wrote.
> Even if people agree on the same Denotations, their
> Connotations can diverge
> into incomprehensibility. On the other hand, unless
> one is a post-modernist,
> we conventionally agree that the word "Unicorn"
> connotes a magical
> horse-like creature with no Denotation; Unicorns do
> not exist.
>
> The catch is that Connotations and Denotations are
> only pre-1920
> psychological concepts unique to human beings, and
> as such are subject to
> Formal Symbolic logic scrutiny to unravel their
> muddled usages. In Formal
> Symbolic logic we now instead distinguish Statements
> from Propositions,
> post-1980. Some systems still confuse the two as a
> pedagogical short-cut
> which is only unraveled much later on in the course.
>
> A further example of Dualism at work. In the
> classroom, Teaching and
> Learning are designed to be "referentially linked".
> However, many on this
> list would find it insulting to be 'taught a
> lesson', but certainly expect
> to learn from the other participants ideas. This
> capability of 'unlinking'
> is essential in any analysis.
>
> David could as well have used the historical
> examples of electricity and
> magnetism whose 'hidden unity' [J.C. Taylor]
> involved just how information
> was transmitted between them, despite their rather
> divergent physical
> characteristics. If David tried to espouse the
> 'magnetic' approach, I have
> tried to show the equivalent 'electric' shock.
>
> Ivan Anotonowitz
>
> > Date: Sun, 27 Aug 2006 17:50:31 -0700
> > From: Eric Scerri <scerri$##$CHEM.UCLA.EDU>
> > Subject: most viewed
> >
> > Most viewed articles from "Foundations of
> Chemistry"
> >
> > Most viewed articles are the full-text articles
> from
> > this journal
> > that have been accessed most frequently within the
> > last 90 days. The
> > collection of most viewed articles below is
> updated
> > weekly.
> > 1. Green Chemistry: An Innovative Technology
> > Kidwai, M., Mohan, R.
> > Published Print: October 2005
> > 2. The Role of Observables and Non-observables in
> > Chemistry: A
> > Critique of Chemical Language
> > Shahbazian, S., Zahedi, M.
> > Published Print: February 2006
> > 3. SOME PRESUPPOSITIONS IN THE METAPHYSICS OF
> > CHEMICAL REACTIONS
> > HARR? R.
> > Published online: 04 April 2006
> > 4. Lavoisier and Mendeleev on the Elements
> > Hendry, R.
> > Published Print: January 2005
>
> By titles, I was keenly interested in No 2 article
> above by Shahbazian and Zahedi. I was curious to see
> which particular sentences in chemical language they
> really criticize and why they think there is a "need
> to develop a clear chemical language".
>
> I feel very disappointed after I read the whole
> paper
> of 15 writing pages, I absolutely have no idea about
> what they are criticizing and why there is the
> "need".
>
> By guessing, they probably criticized Gillespie's
> work
> shown at the end of Page 38:
>
> "His (Gillespie's) concluding remarks were: 'Unlike
> an
> orbital, the electron density of a molecule is a
> physical observable that can be obtained by
> experiment...'. This leads to the question of why
> electron charge densities and other mathematical
> functions derived from charge densities are
> observables
> and if it is possible to replace orbitals with
> charge
> density".
>
> This doubly quoted statement probably mean that
> Shahbazian and Zahedi don't agree with Gillespie's
> remarks. It is strange that Shahbazian and Zahedi do
> not make their opinion clear while they are calling
> to
> clarify the chemcial languange.
>
> Shahbazian and Zahedi attempt to discuss "how can
> chemists' use of orbitals be justified?". For
> example:
>
> "A well-known example found in general chemistry
> texts is a sentence such as: "The sp3 hybridization
> of
> the carbon atom in methane causes its tetrahedral
> geometry". Although, at first glance, it seems that
> we
> are faced with a causal sentence, this is not the
> case. If we ask a chemist how we can be sure that
> the carbon atom has sp3 hybridization in the methane
> molecule, the carbon tetrahedral shape will be
> offered
> as the main reason! It seems that tetrahedral
> geometry
> and sp3 hybridization confirm each other in a
> circular
> manner, like a logical loop. Here, tetrahedral
> geometry and sp3 hybridization have the same logical
> depth."
>
> What do they really mean here? Do they mean that it
> is
> perfectly fine to say "The sp3 hybridization of the
> carbon atom in methane causes its tetrahedral
> geometry"?
>
> To me, they are saying that "something causes
> something" is equavalent to "something does not
> cause
> something".
>
> It seems to me that the logic is made up-side-down.
> Any one can say anything one wants. YES means NO and
> NO means YES. Could some one please kindly come
> forward to explain more about what they really want
> to
> criticize particularly?
>
> Thanks.
>
> Sengen
>
>
>
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